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In the 1990s, Russia’s development emphasized reform-
ing formal institutions. Yet the outcome of these reforms
often depended on informal practices that both opposed
and contributed to formal structures. These informal
practices moderated some of the exigencies of transition,
helping companies to exploit legal loopholes and opti-
mize tax schemes. However, they also allowed companies
to engage in asset stripping, share dilution, and transfer
pricing, not to mention the limitation of shareholder vot-
ing rights and the abuse of Russia’s insolvency laws. While
the Russian economy of today is much more stable and
prosperous than it was 10 years ago, Russian businesses
continue to require a high degree of informality to ‘get
things done’. Informal practices persist because interper-
sonal trust compensates for popular distrust of state and
financial institutions. 
Informality and Russia’s economic transition
Informality is commonly associated with corruption and
the absence of the rule of law; it is believed to subvert
the foundations of good governance and investor confi-
dence. Informality certainly allows competent players of
informal rules to bend the system to their advantage.
What is rarely noticed, however, is that these practices
played a key role in transforming Soviet enterprises into
private businesses able to compete in a market environ-
ment. For example, Adachi underscores the importance
of informal corporate governance practices in three
major Russian companies–the oil company Yukos, Russ-
ian Aluminium and Norilsk Nickel–in their struggle to
survive, to deal with the disintegration of the Soviet eco-
nomic system, and to compete and grow under post-
Soviet constraints (Adachi 2005). In How Russia Really
Works (Ledeneva 2006), informal practices associated
with barter, financial schemes, and alternative contract
enforcement mechanisms are shown to have both
advanced business and strengthened the importance of
non-market alliances, which are both competitive and
anti-competitive. 
While informal practices rapidly adapt to legal changes
and make use of legal institutions, they also create
obstacles to consolidating the rule of law. Although pri-
marily benefiting certain groups, informality caters to a
wider set of economic needs and is implicitly endorsed
by the state. The state itself is sometimes accused of ‘tax
terrorism’ against business. Hainsworth and Tompson
(2002) refer to ‘the informal fiscal system’ that reflects
official responses to short-term financial and political
pressures. Part of the problem is the lack of clear, acces-
sible, and consistent rules. Thus, contradictions in tax
legislation virtually guarantee a degree of informality,
since officials must decide which rules to enforce and
when. The tax organs sustain non-transparency by
devising enabling regulations that allow them to manip-
ulate inconvenient legislation. Vested interests in state
agencies lead to informal ‘bargaining’ between taxpay-
ers and officials at all levels. The formal rules of the
game–tax legislation, normative acts, ministerial instruc-
tions–are important factors in these negotiations, but
they are not definitive. 
which are broadly distributed across different regions
and social groups. 
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Firms often resort to paying in cash to avoid taxation
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‘One-Stop-Shop’
Reforms in Ukraine: 
Do They Work?
Vyacheslav Toporov
Massive job destruction and the spread of poverty
have accompanied the transition from a socialist to a
market economy in Ukraine. While the post-1999 eco-
nomic recovery has increased wages and productivity,
it has not yet brought substantial improvements in job
creation to reduce poverty. The poor endure longer
periods of unemployment, have more restricted access
to the labour market, and are overrepresented in sec-
tors with high rates of underemployment such as agri-
culture and construction. More rapid business forma-
tion could alleviate these tensions by creating more
income- and employment-generation opportunities.
The relationship between taxpayer and tax collector is
not normally based on negotiation, but in Russia, as
Hainsworth and Tompson indicate, ‘The bargained tax
bill is no more a paradox than was the bargained plan‘.
Unlike the use of black cash or bribery, many tax
schemes are grounded in legal loopholes and can be
more properly described as tax avoidance than tax eva-
sion. They exploit defects in the tax legislation which,
according to some respondents, may have been left
there on purpose. The centrality of law in such creative
scheming, however, is a noticeable and positive devel-
opment. 
The key role of Russian banks
Russian banks tend to play a dual role vis-à-vis the tax
organs–they are both taxpayers to, and agents of, the
fiscal organs. Since a substantial share of tax revenues
is collected via the payments system, tax authorities
rely heavily on banks not only to provide information
about clients’ finances, but also to cooperate in tax
collection. This practice creates an incentive for firms
to conduct transactions in cash. However, the use of
black-cash strategies by firms is limited, and typically
requires the banks’ help in obtaining large quantities
of cash in violation of restrictions on the use of cash
for inter-company transactions. Hence, banks play a
critical role in so-called ‘tax optimization’ strategies. 
The centrality of banks in managing financial flows
and information, and in mediating between tax col-
lectors and tax payers, allows them to create and
exploit these profitable lines of business. Russia’s
Central Bank fell under intense scrutiny following the
murder of Andrei Kozlov, its first Deputy Chairman, in
September 2006. There are widespread concerns that
Central Bank decisions concerning small- and medi-
um-sized banks are overly subjective and often polit-
ically motivated. 
Trust-based relationships are also the basis for insider
trading, which (given the few legal restrictions on it)
seems widespread on Russian financial markets. While
the law ‘On Securities Markets’ prohibits trading based
on ‘office information’, its definition is vague and penal-
ties for its use are insufficient. The notion of ‘insider
information’ is not used, and the Federal Service for
Financial Markets (FSFM) has insufficient powers to deal
with it. A draft of the law on ‘insider information’ was
prepared by the FSFM in 2005; it remains under discus-
sion. Whether its eventual enactment will reduce the
scale of insider trading and price manipulation remains
to be seen.
It is often assumed that informal practices in Russian busi-
ness are a Soviet phenomenon and thus are less common
today. Our research and recent events in the banking sec-
tor dispel this myth. Informal practices, in particular those
associated with discrete banking services, are reported to
be essential for business operations and indicative of the
importance of interpersonal trust in Russian business
(Ledeneva 2006). The prime break with the Soviet past
has taken place in relation to the poor. Informal practices
in today's Russia are much more exclusive and do not
cater to their needs.
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